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 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESIGN 
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS— 
SOME MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: 
HONG KONG’S PROPOSED FINANCIAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION CENTER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, AND SINGAPORE 
Shahla F. Ali† & Antonio Da Roza†† 
Abstract: Systems of financial dispute resolution currently operate in most major 
financial centers throughout the world.  As such systems expand and develop to address a 
growing number of finance-related disputes, they must inevitably address the question of 
their role and function in financial market regulation.  Such questions are rooted in the 
larger socio-legal dispute processing debate examining how institutional dispute 
resolution mechanisms effectively regulate the repeat player knowledge/power gap 
through appropriate policies and procedures.  Using the example of Hong Kong in 
comparison with financial dispute resolution models currently in existence in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, and the United States, this article finds that the 
appropriateness of a dispute resolution method is arguably informed by whether it takes 
on a regulatory or non-regulatory role.  Regulatory dispute resolution modes taking on 
inquisitorial elements may be preferred when displacing the judicial function as they 
incorporate safeguards for disputants against the discretion of the third party intervener.  
But even for non-regulatory schemes, inquisitorial elements aimed at addressing the 
power/knowledge gap including suggesting the provision of information regarding 
relevant standards and rules, at least as touchstones, may still be incorporated into 
consensual models of dispute resolution, which aim to ensure a de minimis level of equity 
and fairness in the process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, Hong Kong’s 
regulators proposed to create a Financial Dispute Resolution Center 
(“FDRC”) for the purposes of deploying and centralizing alternative dispute 
resolution techniques in Hong Kong’s financial markets.1  In recent times, 
legal scholars have offered important insights in the area of designing 
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Law, University of Hong Kong; B.A., Stanford University; M.A., Landegg University; J.D., Boalt Hall 
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1
  FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INVESTOR 
EDUCATION COUNCIL AND A FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE (2010), available at  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/fa/papers/facb1-1127-1-e.pdf.  
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effective and efficient systems of dispute resolution in diverse sectors.2  This 
article will focus in particular on practical and principle based considerations 
relevant to the design of Hong Kong’s Financial Dispute Resolution Center. 
 In comparing the key elements of the proposal for Hong Kong with 
dispute resolution schemes for financial markets of other 
jurisdictions―specifically, the United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore and 
the United States―two related issues arise.  First, what is the role of dispute 
resolution in financial markets and their regulation?  Second, which 
alternative dispute resolution techniques are most appropriate for use in 
financial markets and what is their level of appropriateness, not only in 
resolving disputes, but also in light of the role dispute resolution plays in 
financial markets and their regulation?  The United Kingdom, United States, 
Australia, and Singapore are selected since they represent two very different 
approaches to financial dispute resolution in well-developed financial 
centers:  one is an ombudsman-based system (United Kingdom and 
Australia) and the other is an arbitration model (United States and 
Singapore).3 
 The well-documented importance of the rule of law to Hong Kong’s 
financial markets is evidenced by the fact that financial services disputes of 
the highest orders occur and are resolved in Hong Kong (e.g., the recent 
“Congo” case at the Court of Final Appeal4 concerning the enforceability of 
debts against the Democratic Republic of Congo in Hong Kong courts). 
However, the financial crisis demonstrated the limits of the existing methods 
of dispute resolution.  Calls for the establishment of an affordable and 
                                                      
2
  See, e.g., WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES 
RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT 41-64 (1988); Janet Martinez & Stephanie 
Smith, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System Design, 14 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 123 (2009); CATHY A. 
COSTANTINO ET AL., DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE 
AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996); Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice 
in Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 1 (2009); THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 61-168 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999); Richard C. Rueben, 
Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 11 
(2005); Jill Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 329 (2006); John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith 
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69 (2002); Sharon Press, 
Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation Program: A View from the Field, 81 KY. L.J. 1029 
(1992); Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-
Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553 (2004); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute 
Systems Design and Transitional Justice, 13 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 329 (2008); Carrie J. Meadow, Are 
There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons 
From International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 195, 195-231 (2009). 
3
  For further elaboration, please see SHAHLA F. ALI, CONSUMER FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT: PRINCIPLES, SYSTEMS AND PRACTICE (forthcoming 2013).   
4
  Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ors v. FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] FACV 5, 6, 
7/2010 (H.K.). 
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efficient method of dispute resolution arising from the crisis thus address 
themselves towards the first issue:  dispute resolution is necessary for 
financial markets not only in providing assurance that disputes over financial 
rights and legal obligations can be determined by an independent arbiter, and 
give rise to enforceable remedies, but beyond that is a greater need for 
accessibility―particularly for consumers.  Hong Kong’s financial markets 
are characterized by high numbers and high levels of participation by private 
individual investors at the retail level, giving rise to its “short-term outlook 
and quasi-gambling nature.”5  It is these private investors on the retail level 
which the proposal addresses―disputes between consumers and financial 
service providers.  Improving accessibility to justice, or the ease with which 
investors may protect their own rights in financial markets, not only serves 
to enhance market participation and capitalization via increased consumer 
confidence, but also serves to enhance market efficiency by lowering the 
amount of resources that need to be dedicated to the resolution of disputes.  
This, in turn, could potentially lead to a redistribution of those resources 
back into capitalization of the financial market. 
 More specifically, in the context of the regulation of financial markets, 
the introduction of alternative dispute resolution, (i.e., alternative to the 
judicial system) while clearly furthering market efficiency by lowering the 
resource-intensiveness of resolving financial disputes, raises the issue of 
whether or not alternative forms of dispute resolution necessarily play the 
same role as the courts in standard-setting and norms for consumer 
protection.  In every jurisdiction, the role of alternative dispute resolution in 
a regulatory context seems to differ, leading to the question of whether or 
not it is desirable for alternative dispute resolution in financial markets to 
have an ad hoc regulatory role in trying to achieve consistency of outcomes 
and awards. 
With regards to market efficiency, determining an appropriate method 
of dispute resolution thus becomes doubly important, as the shortcomings of 
an ineffective dispute resolution method could well lead to an adverse effect 
not just on consumer confidence, but market efficiency, as well as an 
increase in the amount of resources dedicated to and associated with dispute 
resolution. 
As Hong Kong moves toward the development of a centralized, 
systemized, alternative dispute resolution scheme at the retail level, it may 
well benefit from the experience of other jurisdictions in being able to 
                                                      
5
  BERRY HSU ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS IN HONG KONG: LAW AND PRACTICE (2006). 
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design an alternative dispute resolution scheme that is both appropriate for 
its financial markets, and also for its regulatory system. 
II. BACKGROUND 
At the end of 2008, the world experienced what is considered to be the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  The effects of 
the crisis manifested in Hong Kong in a number of ways, of which the most 
prominently featured in local media was the Minibonds Crisis, in respect to 
which the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“HKMA”) and the Securities 
and Futures Commission (“SFC”) received over 16,000 complaints and 
resulted in many protests and demonstrations.6  In response, the Hong Kong 
government set out to establish a dispute resolution mechanism to handle 
complaints arising out of the crisis. 
A. Resolving the Minibonds Crisis and Dispute Resolution in Hong Kong 
At the heart of the Minibonds Crisis was whether or not the risks 
associated with these complex products were fully disclosed and 
communicated to the retail investors who purchased them.  This gave rise to 
two complaints in particular:  first, the way in which Minibonds had been 
sold to the retail market, particularly by the banks carrying on securities 
business; and second, their suitability for particular customers given their 
complexity.   
As a result of these complaints, retail investors who had purchased 
Minibonds felt they were entitled to the return of the principal invested 
following the filing for bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which triggered the 
unwinding of the Minibonds―leading to their value falling to little more 
than a fraction of the principal.  In late September and early October 2008, 
hundreds of Minibond investors took to the streets of Hong Kong’s central 
business district in protest, and also staged demonstrations at the offices and 
branches of distributing banks. 
In response, on October 2, 2008, the Hong Kong Association of Banks 
formed a task force on Lehman-related investment products.7  On October 6, 
2008, the Hong Kong government proposed that the distributing banks buy 
                                                      
6
  Hong Kong Democratic Foundation, Proposal for Resolution of Mini-Bond Issue (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.hkdf.org/pr.asp?func=show&pr=178 (last visited May 1, 2012). 
7
  The Hong Kong Association of Banks, The Hong Kong Association of Banks Sets Up Task Force 
to Follow Up Lehman Brothers Incident (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.hkab.org.hk/DisplayWhatsNewsAction
.do?ss=1&id=37 (last visited May 1, 2012). 
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back the Minibonds at market price, to which the Task Force agreed. 8  
However, legal hurdles in the form of the relevant United States bankruptcy 
laws prevented the liquidation of the Minibonds, which would have been 
necessary for the buy-back.9  A cease-and-desist letter was issued in respect 
to the liquidation of the Minibonds on November 25, 2008, leading to an 
announcement by distributing banks that they would be prepared to finance 
the trustee for the Minibonds up to $100 million to assist its performance of 
its duties to protect the interests of Minibond investors.10 
1. Regulatory Gap 
Article 109 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong requires that “the 
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide 
an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the 
status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre.”11  In particular, in 
respect to the financial retail market, it serves to highlight the importance of 
Hong Kong’s status as an international financial center in its enshrinement in 
a constitutional document. 
The day-to-day regulation of Hong Kong’s financial markets is 
generally sectoral, with a separate regulator for each sector (i.e., HKMA for 
banks and banking, SFC for securities and futures institutions and markets, 
and the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (“OCI”) for insurance 
business).  One notable exception to the sectoral approach of Hong Kong’s 
regulatory system is the oversight of the HKMA of all activities of banks, 
including their business in securities or insurance.  The HKMA regulates the 
banks in these areas using the same rules and standards that are applied by 
the sector regulators, i.e., the SFC and OCI, but banks are otherwise 
regulated on an institutional basis. 
Unlike in Singapore, where the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
announced on January 16, 2009 that financial institutions who had 
fraudulently sold Minibonds would make full or partial settlement to 58% of 
                                                      
8
  Legislative Council, Background Brief on the Lehman Brothers Minibonds Collateral Recovery 
Agreement and Related Issues (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr1011/english/panels/fa/papers/fa
0421cb1-1979-e.pdf (last visited May 1, 2012). 
9
  REPORT OF THE HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY ON ISSUES CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF STRUCTURED PRODUCTS CONNECTED TO LEHMAN GROUP COMPANIES 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/lehman_report.pdf. 
10
  Id.; see also Letter from Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP to U.S. Bank Corporate Trust Services-
CDO Group (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.pwchk.hk/webmedia/doc/634354518955653280_mi
nibonds_doc_wgm_nov2008.pdf. 
11
  The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Art. 109 (promulgated by the 
President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, effective July 1, 1997), available at 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text.pdf. 
490 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 21 NO. 3 
 
complainants—with 25% receiving all of the principal invested while 33% 
would receive at least part of their principal—the powers of the regulators in 
Hong Kong do not extend to direct interventions on behalf of consumers in 
consumer disputes.  As was noted in an earlier review of banking consumer 
protection by the HKMA: 
 A key difference between Hong Kong and the other two 
comparison jurisdictions is that the regulators in both the UK 
and Australia have been given an explicit mandate in relation to 
the protection of consumers of financial and banking services.  
In the case of Hong Kong, the HKMA only has a general duty 
to ‘provide a measure of protection to depositors’ under the 
Banking Ordinance (Cap.155).  There is no explicit mandate 
with respect to consumer protection.12  
A similar provision is found in the Securities and Futures Ordinance 
(Cap.571) in respect to the functions of the SFC:  “to secure an appropriate 
degree of protection for members of the public investing in or holding 
financial products . . . .”13 
Consumer complaints or disputes are instead dealt with in the Code of 
Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the SFC, which applies 
to all persons licensed by the SFC to conduct regulated activities such as 
dealing in securities.14  The Code of Conduct also applies to banks registered 
with the SFC to carry out such activities.  Under section 12.3 of the Code of 
Conduct: 
A registered person should ensure that:  (a) complaints from 
clients relating to its business are handled in a timely and 
appropriate manner; (b) steps are taken to investigate and 
respond promptly to the complaints; and (c) where a complaint 
is not remedied promptly, the client is advised of any further 
steps which may be available to the client under the regulatory 
system.15 
                                                      
12
  Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Comparative Study on Banking Consumer Protection and 
Competition Arrangements in the UK, Australia and Hong Kong: An Introductory Note 3-4 (Apr. 27, 2001), 
available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-01/english/panels/fa/papers/a1112e02.pdf.  
13
  Securities and Futures Ordinance (2003), Cap. 571, 5 § (1)(1) (H.K.).  
14
  Under Schedule 5 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, the ten types of regulated activities are:  
dealing in securities, dealing in futures contracts, leveraged foreign exchange trading, advising on securities, 
advising on futures contracts, advising on corporate finance, providing automated trading services, 
securities margin financing, asset management and credit ratings services.  Id.  
15
  Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures 
Commission (2010), § 12.3 (H.K.). 
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Little information has been made available as to whether or not 
Minibond complainants had made use of internal complaints systems (if 
any) of the Minibond distributors, what the results of those complaints were, 
and how the internal complaints systems of the distributors might interact 
with the regulatory system.  This left Minibond complainants to contend 
with the various modes of dispute resolution in Hong Kong. 
2. Courts, Litigation, and Alternative Dispute Resolution Culture in 
Hong Kong 
While the court system in Hong Kong is well established, the lack of a 
centralized dispute resolution scheme for Hong Kong’s financial industry 
may be attributed to the nascent exposure to alternative dispute resolution in 
Hong Kong, specifically mediation.  With the exception of arbitration, which 
is governed by the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609), 16  “other ADR 
processes such as mediation do not have any statutory procedures and 
operation” 17  in Hong Kong.  In particular, the lack of knowledge and 
experience with alternative dispute resolution procedures amongst legal 
professionals in Hong Kong is attributed to the traditional legal environment 
and culture in which these lawyers are trained and practice.18  Alternative 
dispute resolution is currently an elective subject in law school curriculum.  
Due to this voluntary participation, the number of practicing lawyers who 
had mediation training in 2007 was cited as 0.08%.19  
Furthermore, litigation remains the first choice for individuals and 
commercial enterprises where courts are better equipped to understand the 
legal dispute, where there is a desire for authoritative and legal precedent 
(which would be thus binding on similar cases), and where court procedures 
allow for judgments to be obtained quickly and cheaply, as may be the case 
in proceedings such as summary judgment.20  Civil litigation was reported to 
have been initiated by Minibond investors in several cases between 2008 and 
200921—the first lawsuits of their type.  However, greater progress appears 
                                                      
16
  Pre Arbitration Ordinance (2011), Cap. 609 (H.K.). 
17
  Gu Weixia, Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong: Challenges and Opportunities for Development of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 40 H.K. L.J. 43, 52 (2010). 
18
  Id. 
19
  Chan Bing Woon & Oscar Tan, Building a Mediation Culture in Hong Kong, ASIAN DISP. REV. 
126 (2007) (though this figure has almost certainly risen since the Civil Justice Reforms came into force). 
20
  Gary Soo, Yun Zhao & Dennis Cai, Better Ways of Resolving Disputes in Hong Kong―Some 
Insights from the Lehman-Brothers Related Investment Product Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme, 
9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 137 (2010). 
21
  Amy Nip, Two Investors Reach Settlement With Bank Before Court Case, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST, Nov. 11, 2008, at A4, available at http://www.pressdisplay.com/pressdisplay/viewer.aspx; Patsy 
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to have been made in criminal litigation related to the Minibonds Crisis than 
civil litigation.  In January 2010, a former Dah Sing Bank employee was 
charged with forging a customer’s signature to buy Minibonds from the 
bank.22  In April 2010, two staff members of the Bank of China (Hong 
Kong) were charged by the Commercial Crimes Bureau for misleading and 
inducing customers to purchase structured products such as the Minibonds,23 
though they were subsequently acquitted.24 
Cases have also been taken to the Small Claims Tribunal, a court that 
deals quickly, informally, and inexpensively with claims not exceeding 
HK$50,000.  Rules and procedures are less strict than other courts, and no 
legal representation is allowed.  One hundred thirty-five Minibond investors 
whose claims did not exceed $50,000 sought to recover money against banks 
in the Tribunal.25   The adjudicator, having heard all the cases, came to 
conclusion that the claims should be referred to the District Court, as the 
cases concerned banks’ responsibilities and risks to consumers, involving 
new and complicated legal points which would have an impact on the public 
banking sector.  The lack of precedent and the fact that the Tribunal might 
not have had the legal power to handle such cases also contributed to the 
decision to refer the cases to the district court.26 
Driven by its incorporation into civil court procedure during the Civil 
Justice Reform, alternative dispute resolution and mediation in particular is 
now receiving much greater attention in Hong Kong.  The success of 
existing court-annexed mediation schemes, such as the pilot scheme for 
family mediation27 and construction disputes,28 has led to the extension of 
such schemes into various facets of civil procedure.29  Alternative dispute 
resolution is explicitly incorporated under Order 25 of the Rules of the High 
Court (Cap. 4A, Sub.Leg.). 30   Order 25 deals with case management 
                                                                                                                                                              
Moy, Lehman Investor to Get her Day in Court, THE STANDARD, Sept. 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?sid=25487561&art_id=88391&con_type=1&pp_cat=30. 
22
  Bank Staff Arrested over Minibonds, LEHMAN VICTIMS ALLIANCE, Mar. 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/bank-staff-arrested-over-minibonds7571.php. 
23
  Id. 
24
  HKSAR v. Chu Lai Sze [2010] HCMA 527/2010; HKSAR v. Tai Ching [2011] DCCC 527 & 
1272/2010; Re Cheung Kwai Kwai [2011] DCCC 526/2010. 
25
  FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 65. 
26
  Id. 
27
  Civil Justice Reform-Interim Report, Interim Report of the Chief Justice’s Working Party on Civil 
Justice Reform, para. 666 (Nov. 21, 2001), available at http://www.civiljustice.gov.hk/ir/paperHTML/Wor
kingParty.html. 
28
  CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, FINAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S WORKING PARTY ON CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM, para. 831 (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/bc/bc57/papers/bc570611cb2-1960-e.pdf. 
29
  Id. para. 797, n.640. 
30
  Rules of the High Court (1989), Cap.4A, O.25 (H.K.).   
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summons and conferences, the means by which the High Court sets out the 
details of proceedings prior to their commencement. 31   Amongst the 
requirements in Order 25 is the mandatory completion of the timetabling 
questionnaire that is filed by the parties on the close of pleadings.32  The first 
section of the questionnaire deals with alternative dispute resolution, and 
requires the parties to either:  1) confirm they have attempted to settle the 
case by alternative dispute resolution but were not successful, or that they 
have no intention of settling the case, or that they are willing to try to settle 
the case by alternative dispute resolution or other means and thus request a 
stay of the proceedings, 2) confirm they have filed a mediation certificate, or 
3) confirm they have filed a mediation notice/response.33  The mediation 
certificate sets out whether or not parties are willing to attempt mediation to 
settle the proceedings, and the reasons if the party is not willing.34  Where 
parties wish to attempt mediation, they should file a mediation notice,35 and 
in response, the other party to the proceedings will file a mediation 
response.36  Under Practice Direction 31 on Mediation, the court may make 
adverse costs orders against parties who unreasonably fail to engage in 
mediation.37 
3. The Consumer Council 
Established in 1974, the Consumer Council provides consumer 
complaint and inquiry services, though it has no powers of adjudication or 
investigation itself.  Complaints about the Minibonds were made to the 
Consumer Council, leading to the creation of a special workforce to handle 
Lehman Brothers Cases on October 30, 2008.38  The workforce was tasked 
with identifying cases for consideration of financial assistance for legal 
action under the Consumer Legal Action Fund (“CLAF”).39  According to 
the press release issued by the Consumer Council, the criteria for financial 
                                                      
31
  Id.  
32
  Id., r.1. 
33
  Id. Annex A (Practice Direction 5.2 on Case Management). 
34
  Id. App. B (Practice Direction 31 on Mediation). 
35
  Id. App. C. 
36
  Id. App. D. 
37
  HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION, CIRCULAR NO. 097/10 (Sept. 27, 2010), available at 
http://hkbademo.zmallplanet.com/members/circulars/2010/2010097.pdf.  The Circular has, however, 
suggested that some practitioners were approaching court-mandated mediation processes as a mere 
formality preceding litigation rather than making genuine efforts to reach settlement.  Id. 
38
  Consumer Council, Consumer Council Has Put in Place a Special Workforce to Handle the 
Lehman Brothers Cases (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/news/pre
ss_releases/2008103001.html. 
39
  Id. 
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assistance included:  vulnerability of the complainants, cogency of evidence 
on untoward sales tactics, inadequate risk disclosure, and 
misrepresentation. 40   The process involved interviewing selected 
complainants, conducting a preliminary legal analysis, and reporting to the 
CLAF Management Committee for recommendation to the Board of 
Administrators for approval.41  A portion of the work was commissioned to 
barristers in private practice in order to expedite the process.42  By the end of 
2008, the Consumer Council reported it had received some 8,274 complaints 
in respect to Minibonds, which contributed to a tenfold increase in 
complaints against financial services for that year.43  At the end of 2009, the 
number of complaints received by the Consumer Council against financial 
services was 4,968. 44   One of the key difficulties for consumers in 
complaining to the Consumer Council is that referral to the CLAF would 
simply direct complainants back to the litigation system.45 
4. Assisted Negotiations 
On December 9, 2008, the Democratic Party announced that it had 
assisted over sixty investors, reaching settlements totaling $30 million in 
compensation from fourteen of the distributing banks. 46   The range of 
compensation was described as “wide” and the average percentage of 
principal received in compensation was described as “high,” but was not 
disclosed.47  The settlements were attributed to the fact that the cases all 
involved regulation violations; however, resolved cases represented less than 
1% of the total number of complaints at the time.48 
                                                      
40
  Id. 
41
  Id. 
42
  Id. 
43
  Consumer Council, Year Ender 2008 (Jan. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/news/press_releases/2009011901.html. 
44
  Consumer Council, Public Education Proved to be Effective: Consumer Complaints Alleviated in 
2010 (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/news/press_releases/201101
2701.html.  
45
  “The Fund aims to . . . assist consumers to bring or defend representative action.”  CONSUMER 
COUNCIL, INFORMATION PAMPHLET ON CONSUMER LEGAL ACTION FUND (June 2003), available at 
http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/legal_protection/consumer_legal_actions_fund/CLAFBriefPD
F.pdf. 
46
  Democratic Party, 成功促使 60 宗雷曼個案和解涉及金額近 3,000 萬港元: 民主黨介紹銀
行 和 解 進 度 和 特 點 (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://www.dphk.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/081209PRESS.pdf. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Id. 
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5. The Minibonds Mediation and Arbitration Scheme 
On October 31, 2008, the HKMA announced a mediation and 
arbitration scheme administered by the HKIAC for complainants in respect 
to Lehman-related investment products distributed by banks (“the 
Scheme”). 49   The Scheme applied to issues of compensation between 
investors in Lehman Brothers-related products and banks licensed by the 
HKMA, and it was specifically limited to investors who had made 
complaints to the HKMA, and whose complaints were referred to the SFC 
or, if there had been a finding, against a relevant individual or executive 
officer of a bank against whom a complaint was made.50   The HKMA 
informed such eligible investors in writing, and would pay half the fee of the 
service, with the other half being borne by the relevant bank.51 
However, the HKIAC also offered a similar service, using the same 
procedures applicable to the Scheme, to investors who were not eligible 
under the above criteria, if the relevant bank consented to take part, though 
the costs would have to be borne by the parties themselves. 
The procedure involved a preparatory meeting followed by mediation 
and, in the event mediation was unsuccessful, arbitration.52   Before the 
dispute resolution process began, parties would attend preparatory meetings 
to familiarize themselves with the mediation process, explore settlement 
options, and exchange information and documents.  The first step of the 
Scheme involved mediation, by which the mediator would attempt to assist 
the parties in reaching a negotiated settlement, or if that were not possible, to 
narrow the issues in dispute, in particular, to agree on common facts that 
may be used in subsequent arbitration or litigation.  In the event that the 
mediation was unsuccessful, the parties could then elect to arbitrate, which 
would be binding on both parties.  Another person that is not the mediator 
would be appointed as arbitrator, and conduct a documents-only arbitration 
to the extent possible.  The arbitrator’s decision would be final.  This 
procedure, however, was not intended for use in all disputes; in particular, it 
was not intended for use in those involving complex issues or requiring the 
examination of witnesses.53 
                                                      
49
  Press Release, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Lehman-Brothers-Related Products Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Scheme (Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-
information/press-releases/2008/20081031-5.shtml (last visited May 1, 2012). 
50
  Id. 
51
  Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Explanatory Note on the Scheme (Oct. 31, 2008), 
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/other-information/lehman/explanatory_b.shtml (last visited May 6, 2012). 
52
 Shahla F. Ali & John Koon Wang, After Lehman: International Response to Financial Disputes– 
A Focus on Hong Kong, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 151 (2011).  
53
  Id. 
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According to the HKIAC’s Year-End Report for 2009, a total of 334 
cases were referred to the Scheme, of which 243 were handled.54  As of 
December 31, 2009, eighty-six cases went through mediation with seventy-
five achieving settlement. 55   Thirty-seven cases were settled by direct 
negotiation.56  No cases were referred to arbitration.57 
6. Regulator-Negotiated Mass Settlement and Subsequent Top-Up 
It was the intervention of the regulators that proved the most effective 
in respect to driving settlement forward.  In early 2009, Sun Hung Kai 
Investment Services and KGI Asia voluntarily offered to repurchase the 
Minibonds after the SFC raised a number of concerns in respect to the 
Minibond sales practices, which formed the basis of reprimands from the 
SFC.  The repurchases were completed on July 2, 2009, and clients of both 
securities broker distributors recovered the principal amounts invested.58 
On July 22, 2009, an agreement was reached between the SFC, 
HKMA, and sixteen of the distributing banks, whereby the banks offered to 
repurchase the Minibonds at a price equal to 60% of the original investment 
amount for their customers below the age of sixty-five, and at 70% for those 
above the age of sixty-five.  Investors who had previously reached 
settlements with the banks would also receive ex gratia payments to bring 
their settlement amounts in line with the agreed settlement rate.  In 
exchange, the distributing banks admitted no liability, and furthermore, the 
SFC discontinued its investigations into the sale and distribution of 
Minibonds by the banks.  The HKMA also informed the banks of its 
intention not to take any enforcement action in respect to the banks whose 
customers accepted the offer.59 
Approximately 24,168 Minibond investors accepted the repurchase 
scheme, for which approximately 97% qualified.  A further 4,800 Minibond 
                                                      
54
  GARY SOO, HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, YEAR-END REPORT FOR 2009 
FROM THE SECRETARIAT 2-3 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.hkiac.org/qwert/images/stories/news
pdf/HKIAC_Year_End_Report_for_2009_from_Secretariat.pdf.  
55
  Anthony Connerty, Lehman Lessons, 160 NEW L.J. 948, 967 (2010). 
56
  Id. 
57
  Id. 
58
  Securities and Futures Commission, Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Ltd Agrees with SFC to 
Repurchase Minibonds From Its Clients at Original Value, SFC ENFORCEMENT NEWS, Jan. 22, 2009, 
available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=09PR8; KGI Asia Ltd 
Agrees with SFC to Repurchase Minibonds from Its Clients at Original Value, SFC ENFORCEMENT NEWS, 
Apr. 5, 2009, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=09PR39. 
59
  Securities and Futures Commission, SFC, HKMA and 16 banks reach agreement on Minibonds, 
SFC ENFORCEMENT NEWS, July 22, 2009, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDoc
Servlet?docno=09PR100. 
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investors who reached settlements before the offer was made in July also 
received top-up payments.60 
Thereafter, an agreement on the same terms in respect to 
compensation was reached between the SFC and Grand Cathay Securities on 
December 17, 2009, 61  bringing an end to investigations of all nineteen 
Minibond distributors. 
Several days later, on December 23, 2009, the SFC, the HKMA, Dah 
Sing Bank, and Mevas Bank reached an agreement in respect to equity-
linked fixed coupon principal protected notes (“Notes”) issued by Lehman 
Brothers, whereby the two banks would repurchase the Notes at 80% of the 
principal amount and also bring earlier settlements in line with that amount.  
Both the SFC and the HKMA agreed not to take any enforcement action 
against the two banks.62 
On January 13, 2010, the SFC reached an agreement with Karl 
Thomson Investment Consultants―who were not distributors of Minibonds 
but had purchased and consequently sold them to eleven clients.  Karl 
Thomson agreed to repurchase the Minibonds on the same terms agreed 
upon by the banks, the SFC, and the HKMA under the July 22, 2009 
settlement.  This may be contrasted with the voluntary repurchases offered 
by SHK Investment Services and KGI Asia.63 
On March 27, 2011, the sixteen distributing banks announced a joint 
proposal along with the receivers of the Minibond collateral for the 
distribution of the net value of the underlying collateral assets and an ex 
gratia top-up payment to Minibond investors, estimated on average to bring 
the value of compensation to 85% and 96.5% of the principal amounts 
invested, respectively.  This has resulted in the disparity between the 
settlements made by securities intermediaries that are directly regulated by 
the SFC, and those made by the registered institutions, such as banks, that 
                                                      
60
  Press Release, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Progress of the HKMA’s Investigations in 
Lehman Brothers Related Cases, HKMA, Oct. 30, 2009, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/2
00910/30/P200910300277.htm. 
61
 Press Release, Securities and Futures Commission, SFC Completes Investigations of All 19 
Minibond Distributors, Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServ
let?docno=09PR176. 
62
  Press Release, Securities and Futures Commission, SFC, HKMA, Dah Sing Bank Ltd,. and Mevas 
Bank Ltd. Resolve Issues Concerning Lehman Equity Index-linked Principal Protected Notes, Dec. 23, 
2009, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=09PR178. 
63
  Press Release, Securities And Futures Commission, SFC Reaches Agreement With Karl Thomson 
Investment Consultants Ltd. Concerning Sale of Lehman Brothers Minibonds, Jan. 13, 2010, available at 
http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=10PR5. 
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are regulated primarily by the HKMA based on the regulations established 
by the SFC being reduced.64 
7. The Recommendations of the Regulators 
In response to the Minibonds Crisis, the Financial Secretary requested 
that both the HKMA and the SFC prepare reports in respect to issues arising 
from the crisis.  The reports were delivered and published in December 
2008. 
The issue of dispute resolution is specifically dealt with in Section 35 
(“Dispute resolution”) of the SFC’s Report to the Financial Secretary on 
Issues Raised by the Lehmans Minibonds Crisis, and in paragraphs 5.2 and 
5.3 on “Remedies available to investors” and paragraphs 8.44 to 8.50 on  
“Recommendations” in the Report of the HKMA on Issues Concerning the 
Distribution of Structured Products Connected to Lehman Group 
Companies. 65 
Both the SFC and the HKMA noted that one of the issues raised by 
the Minibonds Crisis was the lack of any quick, simple, or efficient means 
by which disputes could be resolved.  The HKMA particularly noted that the 
role of the regulators in receiving complaints is confined to ensuring 
compliance with regulatory requirements, but there was no power to 
adjudicate disputes or order compensation. 
The SFC suggested in its report that a dispute resolution scheme 
should be “simple, consumer friendly, and free of charge (or substantially 
so)” 66  while the HKMA noted that dispute resolution mechanisms are 
available in other jurisdictions for low cost.67  The SFC also suggested that 
such a scheme should be made mandatory under the Code of Conduct by 
specifying a right to dispute resolution procedures under client agreements, 
but should avoid unduly legalistic procedures and discourage the 
involvement of legal representatives.  It also suggested that a financial 
ombudsman would need to be empowered to order compensation.68 
                                                      
64
  Securities and Futures Commission, SFC and HKMA Welcome Minibond Collateral Recovery 
Agreement, SFC ENFORCEMENT NEWS, Mar. 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=11PR35. 
65
  SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION, ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEHMANS MINIBONDS CRISIS: 
REPORT TO THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY (2008), available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/
lehman/Review Report/Review Report.pdf. 
66
 Id. para. 35.3. 
67
  Hong Kong Monetary Authority, REPORT OF THE HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY ON ISSUES 
CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF STRUCTURED PRODUCTS CONNECTED TO LEHMAN GROUP COMPANIES 
6 (2008), available at http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/other-information/lehman_report.pdf. 
68
 SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEHMANS MINIBONDS CRISIS: 
REPORT TO THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY, supra note 65.  
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The HKMA noted that such a scheme would reduce pressure on the 
regulators’ limited resources, particularly where the incidents generated 
large numbers of complaints, but if such a scheme were to be introduced, 
protocols would also be needed where systemic issues arose. 
B. The Proposal of the FDRC and Comparison with Schemes in Four 
Jurisdictions 
The recommendations made by the SFC and HKMA in their 
respective reports gave rise to a proposal in February 2010 by the Financial 
Services and the Treasury Bureau (“FSTB”) in respect to the establishment 
of the FDRC.  The FSTB conducted a study of dispute resolution schemes 
for the financial industries of four jurisdictions:  the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Singapore, and the United States.  The four dispute resolution 
schemes considered were the Financial Ombudsman Service of the United 
Kingdom (“FOS (UK)”), the Financial Ombudsman Service of Australia 
(“FOS (Aus)”), the Financial Industry Dispute Resolution Centre 
(“FIDReC”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), 
respectively. 
1. United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services and Markets Act of 
2000 consolidated the regulation of financial services and markets under the 
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), a single regulator for the entire 
financial industry.69  A consolidated statutory dispute resolution scheme was 
also created―the Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”).70 
Eight independent ombudsmen and complaint-handling schemes were 
incorporated into the FOS (UK), including the Insurance Ombudsman 
Bureau (as the insurance division of the FOS), the Personal Investment 
Authority and the Securities and Futures Authority Complaints Bureau (as 
the investment division of the FOS (UK)), and the Banking Ombudsman and 
the Building Societies Ombudsman (as the banking and loans division of the 
FOS (UK)).71 
                                                      
69
  Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), cl. 8 (U.K.). 
70
  Under the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), § 16, sch. 17, cl. 8 (U.K.) and the 
Consumer Credit Act (2006), § 59, cl. 14 (U.K.), the FOS (UK) is set up as the statutory dispute-resolution 
scheme. 
71
  FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000 
(2000), available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/first-annual-report/ar-1999-
2000.pdf. 
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2. Australia 
Responsibility for the regulation of financial markets in Australia is 
primarily split between the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (“ASIC”) and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.  
On July 1, 2008, three of the largest existing complaints schemes in the 
financial services industry of Australia were consolidated into a centralized 
financial dispute resolution scheme approved by ASIC.72  The Banking and 
Financial Services Ombudsman, the Insurance Ombudsman Service, and the 
Financial Industry Complaints Service were merged into a single external 
dispute resolution service under a newly created company.73  On January 1, 
2009, the Credit Union Dispute Resolution Centre and Insurance Brokers 
Disputes Limited were also merged to become the Mutual division and the 
Insurance Broking divisions, respectively.74 
In addition to the Financial Ombudsman Service, another external 
dispute resolution scheme has recently emerged from obscurity in respect to 
financial advice and investment-related disputes―the Credit Ombudsman 
Service Limited (“COSL”).  The COSL was originally incorporated as the 
Mortgage Industry Ombudsman Service Limited in 2003, before adopting its 
present name in 2004.75  It provides a free dispute resolution service for 
consumer complaints against its members, which include non-bank lenders, 
finance brokers, credit unions, building societies, debt collection firms, 
financial planners, trustees, servicers, aggregators, and mortgage managers, 
among others.76  It was in the past considered an external dispute resolution 
scheme only for the mortgage broking industry, but this was the result of 
misinformation and the investment industry’s relative ignorance of its 
existence.77  However, financial advisory and investment groups appear to 
be taking greater notice of the scheme, which has also had its profile raised 
by the introduction of the national consumer credit regime in Australia. 
                                                      
72
  FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, INQUIRY INTO COLLAPSES IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
INDUSTRY, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?u
rl=corporations_ctte/fps/submissions/sub388.pdf. 
73
  Id. 
74
  The Financial Ombudsman Service Establishes Mutuals and Insurance Broking Divisions 
FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.fos.org.au/centric/home_page/news/the_financial_ombuds
man_service_establishes_mutuals_and_insurance_broking_divisions.jsp (last visited May 1, 2012). 
75
  COSL’s History, CREDIT OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.cosl.com.au/COSLs-History (last 
visited May 1, 2012). 
76
  COSL’s Role, CREDIT OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.cosl.com.au/COSLs-Role (last visited 
May 1, 2012). 
77
  Lucinda Beaman, FOS Alternative Emerges, MONEY MGMT. (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.moneymanagement.com.au/news/fos-alternative-emerges. 
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The existence of two competing dispute resolution schemes, as noted 
by the COSL head of operations and chairman,78 is inherently positive for 
consumers and financial service providers, particularly in encouraging 
competitiveness in lowering the costs of dispute resolution and enhancing 
consumer protection via the broad range of disputes covered by the two 
schemes. 
 Due to the similarity between FOS (Aus) and the COSL, for the 
purposes of this article, discussion in respect to Australia will focus on FOS 
(Aus). 
3. Singapore 
The banking and insurance sectors of Singapore previously had in 
place dispute resolution mechanisms―the Consumer Mediation Unit and the 
Insurance Disputes Resolution Organization respectively—but there was no 
such mechanism for its capital markets.  A working group of capital markets 
representatives concluded in 2003 that it would be more cost effective to 
leverage the resources of existing schemes rather than to establish a new 
scheme for capital markets given the relatively small number of complaints 
in the capital markets sector.79 
 In May 2004, the Monetary Authority of Singapore formed an 
Integration Steering Committee to facilitate the integration of dispute 
resolution schemes for Singapore’s financial sector. 80   This integrated 
scheme, the Financial Industry Dispute Resolution Centre, was aimed at 
providing coverage for most retail consumer complaints in the financial 
sector.81  It was officially launched on August 31, 2005.82 
4. United States 
In the United States, self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) form an 
integral part of federal statutory regulation of the securities industry.  
                                                      
78
  “My Board and I are conscious that COSL is one of only two external dispute resolution (‘EDR’) 
schemes operating in Australia with the approval of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(‘AISC’).  It is a privilege that we do not take for granted and an acknowledgement that healthy 
competition in the sector is vital to promote transparency and accountability and to discourage 
complacency and mediocrity.”  CREDIT OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON OPERATIONS 2009–
2010 (2010), available at http://www.cosl.com.au/Resources/COSL/Files/AnnualReportOnOperations-
2010.pdf. 
79
 MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DISPUTES RESOLUTION CENTRE 
(“FIDREC”) (2004), available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/resource/publications/consult_papers/2004/Public
_Consultation_Paper_FIDReC.pdf. 
80
  Id. 
81
  Id. 
82
  FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DISPUTES RESOLUTION CENTRE LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006 (2006). 
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Originally private sector membership organizations of securities industry 
professionals that set standards of conduct for their members and disciplined 
errant members, these organizations pre-date the federal securities laws in 
1933 and 1934.  Certain concepts of federal law were in fact lifted from 
SRO regulation and became an added layer of regulation, while the SROs 
themselves have been integrated into federal statutory regulation, with the 
Securities Exchange Commission exercising oversight.83 
Of particular note is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”), which consolidated the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (“NASD”) and the member regulation, enforcement and arbitration 
functions of New York Stock Exchange Regulation (“NYSE Regulation”).  
The purpose of consolidating the two was to bring more efficiency to the 
regulation of the securities industry by creating a single set of rules for 
broker-dealers under FINRA.  Following this merger, FINRA became the 
largest non-governmental regulator for securities firms doing business in the 
United States.84  Its role includes market oversight, salesperson regulation, 
investor education, enforcement, and arbitration.  This differs from the 
ombudsmen used in the three common law jurisdictions, as an ombudsman 
exists only to provide an extra-judicial route to resolving disputes, whereas 
an SRO may have a much wider range of regulatory functions in respect to 
its members, of which dispute resolution may only be a small part. 
III. THE PROPOSED FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER 
The key features of the proposed FDRC are 1) the creation of a FDRC 
to administer a financial dispute resolution scheme, 2) a two-tiered financial 
dispute resolution scheme whereby disputes are first mediated, and if 
mediation fails, arbitrated, 3) participation in the scheme by financial 
institutions regulated or licensed by the SFC or the HKMA, 4) a 
HK$500,000 cap on claims under the scheme, 5) a “pay-as-you-use” charge 
to both claimants and institutions, with higher fees payable by financial 
institutions, and 6) the FDRC would not be empowered with any 
investigatory or disciplinary powers. 
While the proposal bears some resemblance to the Scheme, key 
differences include a ceiling on claims, charges to complainants as well as 
service providers, the exclusion of Mandatory Provident Fund (“MPF”) and 
                                                      
83
  Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered 
Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008). 
84
  Karen Powell, Business Law: What Montana Lawyers Need to Know About FINRA, 33 MONT. L. 
REV. 31 (2008). 
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insurance disputes, and systemic concerns being passed back to the 
regulators for investigation. 
A. Jurisdiction 
Not every dispute may be submitted to financial dispute resolution 
schemes―restrictions are often imposed to exclude certain types of 
complainant or certain types of dispute.  Further to the distinction between 
the retail and wholesale financial markets, restrictions are applied even 
within the retail market.85  The proposed jurisdiction of the FDRC must thus 
be considered in the context of the limitations imposed on who may bring 
disputes, and the types of dispute they may bring. 
1. Eligible Complainants 
Complainants are restricted under the FDRC proposal to individual 
consumers and sole proprietors.86  Some respondents to the consultation on 
the proposal suggested that the eligible complainants should be expanded to 
include small companies, to which the FSTB replied that the intention of the 
FDRC was to “take care of the group who would need the service most,” 
though the possibility of expanding the scope of coverage remains open.87 
There may be a number of reasons for restricting eligible 
complainants.  As can be seen from the example of the United States in the 
table below, as the FINRA arbitration process is entirely paid for by 
complainants and securities firms, it was unnecessary to put in place 
jurisdictional filters.  Under the FINRA arbitration model, few of FINRA’s 
resources are taken up by the dispute resolution process―by contrast, the 
dispute resolution schemes in the common law jurisdictions are heavily 
subsidized, giving rise to a need to limit eligible complainants to ensure that 
the subsidies are taken up by those with the greatest need for them. 
The restriction on eligible complainants for the FDRC is the same 
restriction currently imposed in Singapore in respect to FIDReC, and is 
perhaps unsurprising given that the FDRC is an entirely new scheme.  
Equally, however, it should come as no surprise that respondents to the 
consultation would have raised the issue of allowing small corporate bodies 
to also be included in the scheme.  It has long been an issue in Hong Kong 
that the expense of civil litigation restricts the access to justice of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, described as part of the “sandwich” class by the 
                                                      
85
  FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1. 
86
  Id. at 32. 
87
  Id. at 33-34. 
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judiciary in addressing concerns about access to justice in civil litigation due 
to high costs.88 
It is unclear, however, why the proposed eligible complainants were 
not determined with reference to persons who fall outside of the 
“professional investor”89 definition that is used in the regulation of licensed 
intermediaries, nor with reference to empirical evidence as to where the need 
for such dispute resolution services may be most needed.  The concept of 
professional investors is found in the Code of Conduct, and exists to exempt 
licensed intermediaries from certain investor protection requirements in 
respect to market professionals (e.g., banks and insurance companies) and 
high net worth individuals, who by virtue of their experience and resources 
would be capable of making informed decisions and protecting their own 
interests.  The concept has equivalents in the four jurisdictions that were 
studied by the FSTB.  Under the FDRC proposal, market professionals 
would be excluded from the eligible complainants, but high net worth 
individuals would be included―despite the fact that they are considered 
sufficiently well-resourced and experienced enough to be excluded from 
certain regulatory requirements. 
TABLE 1 
SCHEME ELIGIBLE COMPLAINANTS 
FOS 
(UK) 
A person who is a consumer, a micro-enterprise, a charity with an annual 
income of less than £1 million, or a trustee of a trust with a net asset value 
of less than £1 million.90  Certain types of complainant are expressly 
excluded under the Rules.91 
FOS 
(Aus) 
“Retail clients” per s.761G of the Corporations Act 2001, including small 
businesses as defined under that section.92 
FIDReC FIDReC’s services are available to all consumers who are individuals or 
sole-proprietors.93 
FINRA Since FINRA complainants must pay an arbitration fee, a hearing deposit, 
and attorneys' fees, cost-deterrence serves as a filter, and strict jurisdictional 
prerequisites for arbitration are unnecessary.94 
                                                      
88
  This has been commented upon by former Chief Justice Andrew Li in his final speech at the 
Opening of the Legal Year Ceremony in 2010 and has also been remarked upon by him in previous 
speeches. 
89
  See Securities and Futures Ordinance (2003), Part 1, sch.1 (H.K.). 
90
  FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FSA HANDBOOK, DISP 2.7.3 (2012), available at 
http://media.fsahandbook.info/pdf/DISP.pdf. 
91
  Id., DISP 2.7.9. 
92
  AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE 
139 (2011), available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg139-published-20-4-
2011.pdf/$file/rg139-published-20-4-2011.pdf. 
93
  The Jurisdiction of FIDReC, FIDREC, http://www.fidrec.com.sg/website/jurisdiction.html (last 
visited May 1, 2012). 
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RECOMMENDATION 1―ELIGIBLE COMPLAINANTS 
Serious consideration should be given to the expansion of eligible 
complainants beyond individuals in the proposal of the FDRC.  This would 
serve to address issues of access to justice for a class of potential 
complainants that has already been identified by the Judiciary as being 
vulnerable to the high costs of civil litigation. 
Moreover, given the potential misallocation of resources, 
consideration should also be given to restricting the subsidized access of 
professional investors to the FDRC, perhaps by way of scaled charges for 
FDRC services for different kinds of user. 
2. Range of Disputes 
The proposed types of disputes the FDRC would handle would be 
confined to those arising out of services provided by financial institutions 
which are licensees or regulatees of the HKMA or the SFC that are 
“monetary” in nature.95 
a. Exclusion of Commercial and Pricing Decisions and Cases Already 
Subject to Court Proceedings  
Specifically excluded from this jurisdiction would be commercial 
decisions (such as the provision of credit or margin facilities), pricing-
related disputes (such as the setting of fees and interest rates), and cases that 
have already been the subject of court proceedings.96  These exclusions are 
largely in line with those in Australia and Singapore, and also those excluded 
in the United Kingdom as well (see the table below for disputes that can be 
dismissed without hearing). 
b. Exclusion of the Mandatory Provident Fund (“MPF”) and Insurance 
Also explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the FDRC are 
insurance matters and Mandatory Provident Fund (“MPF”) (i.e., retirement) 
matters, due to the existence of a dispute resolution scheme for the insurance 
sector, the Insurance Claims Complaints Bureau, and the lack of monetary 
disputes in the MPF system.97 
                                                                                                                                                              
94
  Cory Alpert, Financial Services in the United States and United Kingdom: Comparative 
Approaches to Securities Regulation and Dispute Resolution, 5 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 75 (2008). 
 
95
 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 35-36. 
96
  Id. at 37. 
97
  Id. at 36. 
506 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 21 NO. 3 
 
However, the FSTB clarified in the Consultation Conclusions that 
where there are complaints relating to insurance and MPF products sold by 
financial institutions within the jurisdiction of the FDRC, those complaints 
will fall within the jurisdiction of the FDRC.  Similar to the HKMA, the 
jurisdiction of the FDRC would be institutional, rather than sectoral.98  It is 
also clarified that the ultimate aim is for the scope of the FDRC to be 
comprehensive, and thus the coverage of the FDRC will be reviewed from 
time to time.99 
While the financial dispute resolution schemes of other leading 
jurisdictions were mergers of pre-existing, sectoral schemes, given that 
alternative dispute resolution on a broad level is just beginning to mature in 
Hong Kong, it is probably preferable that these disputes remain outside of 
the jurisdiction of the FDRC at the moment.  Insurance products in 
particular, having their own dispute resolution scheme, could potentially 
give rise to confusion if they are also made subject to the jurisdiction of the 
FDRC.  Moreover, as was seen in the Minibonds Crisis, there is potential for 
overlapping jurisdictions to give rise to disparity of awards, which would 
lead to consumer dissatisfaction.  It should be noted that even in jurisdictions 
where there is a single financial dispute resolution scheme, such as Australia 
and Singapore, separate limits remain for insurance complaints.  
3. “Monetary Nature”―A Distinction That is Not Made in Any Other 
Jurisdiction 
Less clear, however, is the “monetary” dispute requirement.  
Paragraph 3.4 of the Consultation Paper refers to coverage of the FDRC as 
restricted to licensees and regulatees of the HKMA and the SFC “given that 
most disputes of monetary nature involve the services in these two 
sectors.” 100   Further enlightenment may be found in paragraph 3.10, 
concerning initial enquiries in the FDRC procedure.  Under sub-paragraph 
(c), “[i]f the dispute also relates to other areas such as concerns about a 
misconduct of the financial institution and/or its staff, the intake officers 
would explain to the consumer what other channels are available for taking 
the case forward.”101  It is thus presumed that the term “monetary dispute” 
refers to complaints or the parts of complaints that exclusively concern 
financial compensation for a complaint.  In attempting to make this 
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distinction, there is a clear indication that the intent behind the FDRC is to 
avoid any regulatory implications arising from its process. 
In the aftermath of the Minibonds Crisis, the attempt to draw a 
distinction between the part of a complaint that only concerns financial 
compensation, as opposed to other allegations that may concern regulatory 
matters, is perhaps understandable.  The distinction appears to be intended to 
emphasize the non-regulatory role of the FDRC, which is to have no 
investigative or disciplinary powers.  As will be seen from the dispute 
resolution procedures of the schemes in the other jurisdictions studied, this 
may be out of line with the practices of many other jurisdictions, under 
which investigations and findings of fact are made.  The distinction is not 
made in any of the other jurisdictions studied, and raises the issue of how a 
decision about compensation can be accurately made without some 
consideration of the underlying circumstances (including those that touch 
upon regulatory matters) and apportionment of blame.  Moreover, in light of 
the experience of other jurisdictions, a further question is whether or not this 
is an effective way to ensure the FDRC remains non-regulatory. 
In response to discussion about the interface between the FDRC and 
the regulators, the FSTB acknowledges that some disputes, which give rise 
to monetary losses, inevitably involve complaints of misconduct, and thus 
complainants are likely to pursue their complaints in parallel with both the 
FDRC and the regulators.  While the concern of the FSTB in this regard 
appears to be to prevent any encroachment of the regulators’ jurisdiction by 
the FDRC, the idea of running complaints in parallel raises a further issue of 
whether or not awards made under the FDRC will need to be adjusted to 
take into account findings of the regulators about the targeted financial 
institutions.  The adjustment to the settlement amount reached with the 
banks in respect to the Minibonds Crisis is a relevant example of how 
circumstances following settlement may have an impact on settlement 
amounts, and the need to make provision for such changes in circumstance 
in order to ensure the award amount reflects the circumstances accurately. 
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TABLE 2 
SCHEME RANGE OF DISPUTES 
FOS 
(UK) 
The activities to which the compulsory jurisdiction of the FOS applies are 
regulated activities (see section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000), payment services, consumer credit activities, lending money 
secured by a charge on land, lending money, paying money by plastic card, 
providing ancillary banking services or any activities including advice.102  
The territorial scope of the compulsory jurisdiction is restricted to activities 
carried on from an establishment in the U.K.103 
FOS 
(Aus) 
The jurisdiction of the FOS (Aus) includes:  complaints against financial 
service providers from individual or individuals, partnerships comprised of 
individuals, corporate trustees of self-managed superannuation funds or 
family trust, small businesses, clubs or incorporated associations, policy 
holders of group life or group general insurance policy where the dispute 
relates to the payment of benefits under the policy; disputes that arise from 
a contract or obligation under Australian law in respect to the provision of a 
financial service, provision of a guarantee or security for financial 
accommodation, entitlement or benefits under life insurance or general 
insurance policies, legal or beneficial interests arising out of financial 
investment or a financial risk facility, claims under motor vehicle insurance 
policies. 104 
FIDReC FIDReC’s jurisdiction extends over all disputes brought by individuals and 
sole proprietors against financial institutions who are members of FIDReC, 
except disputes over commercial decisions (including pricing and other 
policies, e.g., interest rates and fees), cases under investigation by any law 
enforcement agency, and cases which have been subjected to a court 
hearing, for which a judgment or order is passed.105 
FINRA The FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedures for Customer Disputes applies 
to any dispute between a customer and a member of FINRA that is 
submitted to arbitration. 106  
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CUSTOMER DISPUTES (2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/
@arbrul/documents/arbmed/p117546.pdf. 
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RECOMMENDATION 2―RANGE OF DISPUTES 
 The proposed jurisdiction of the FDRC should have a sectoral, rather 
than institutional basis not only to avoid the issues of inconsistency, 
confusion, and forum-shopping by eligible complainants, but to reflect the 
underlying regulatory regime that applies to the services that are the subject 
of the FDRC resolution.  Hence, all MPF and insurance disputes should be 
referred back to the relevant dispute resolution/complaint scheme, or 
alternatively, uniform handling processes for such disputes must be 
developed by the FDRC in conjunction with such schemes in order to ensure 
that such disputes are dealt with in the same way. 
 The parallel complaints process should be streamlined so that 
complainants need not go through complaint filing twice, as with the dual 
oversight of listing documents by the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing 
Limited and the SFC.  
In developing the concept of a parallel complaints process, issues 
arise as to how findings of fact in one part of the process will inform the 
other.  It may thus be preferable to abandon the use of the “monetary nature” 
distinction in favor of a streamlined complaints process that, where 
regulatory issues arise out of a complaint, the findings of any investigation 
may be used in the dispute resolution process and any regulatory breaches 
could give rise to a summary procedure for an award under the FDRC. 
B. Procedure 
The proposed procedure that the FDRC will follow involves three 
stages.  First, there is a preliminary stage at which complaints will be 
assessed for whether or not they fall within the jurisdiction of the FDRC.107  
Second, where the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the FDRC, it 
will be mediated.108  Finally, if mediation fails to resolve the dispute, the 
dispute will be referred to an arbitrator. 109   Prima facie, the proposed 
procedure resembles the procedures found in the four jurisdictions studied. 
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TABLE 3 
SCHEME DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE 
FOS 
(UK) 
The approach of the FOS (UK) depends on the facts of the complaint, but 
generally, the FOS (UK) will attempt to settle the complaint informally 
through mediation or conciliation.  If such conciliation or mediation is not 
possible, based on the relevant documents, an adjudicator’s view on how 
the case should be resolved is given in writing to both sides.  Where one 
side is unhappy with the adjudicator’s view, it can ask for a review and final 
decision by an ombudsman.   
FOS 
(Aus) 
The FOS (Aus) will review and consider the dispute, and try to resolve the 
dispute through mutual agreement, including conciliation or negotiation 
methods.110  Where mutual agreement is not possible, the FOS (Aus) will 
conduct a detailed investigation and may offer initial views on the merits of 
the dispute if it will assist the parties in reaching a resolution.111  The FOS 
(Aus) will often issue a recommendation, and if it is not accepted by either 
party, a determination can be made.112 
FIDReC There is a three-stage process in the settlement of disputes by the  FIDReC.  
First, the Counseling Service assists in a preliminary review of the case 
based on facts and documents provided by the complainant. After the 
preliminary review, the consumer is provided with a copy of FIDReC’s 
dispute resolution form and allowed time to consider whether to proceed to 
lodge a formal complaint against the financial institution in question.113  A 
case manager will try to mediate a settlement between the consumer and 
financial institution.  Where appropriate, mediation conferences are 
arranged to allow parties to communicate face-to-face.114  Disputes that 
cannot be resolved by mediation and case management will proceed to the 
third stage, where an adjudicator or panel of adjudicators with relevant 
expertise will decide in favor of either the consumer or the financial 
institution.115 
FINRA FINRA Dispute Resolution (“FINRADR”) provides a non-binding 
mediation program and arbitration services.   
1. The Preliminary Stage 
The preliminary stage of the FDRC dispute resolution process 
involves an intake officer trained in mediation.116  Complainants make an 
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inquiry, and it is then up to the intake officer to address the enquiry and 
decide whether or not the dispute raised by the complainant is within the 
jurisdiction of the FDRC.117  Where that dispute falls within the jurisdiction 
of the FDRC, the complainant shall complete a claim form, upon receipt 
which the intake officer will conduct a fact-finding exercise and also invite a 
response from the relevant financial institution.118  The intake officers at this 
stage explore the settlement of the dispute before it enters the mediation 
stage, and it is proposed that the intake officers have final and conclusive 
discretion not to process a dispute where it appears frivolous or vexatious.119  
In the Consultation Conclusions on the FDRC, it was clarified that the 
qualification and training of the intake officers are of particular importance, 
and the criteria for taking up cases should also be made clear.120 
This proposed preliminary stage reflects the importance of the hotline 
and the preparatory meetings in gathering information before the dispute 
resolution process begins, which was one of the key lessons learned from the 
Lehman Scheme. 121   It also bears some resemblance to the preliminary 
review of the FIDReC, though the proposed exploration of an early 
settlement does not appear to go as far as to highlight relevant clauses and 
issues for the complainant. The experience in Singapore reflects a high 
success rate with its case management process, introduced in 2007.  For the 
thirty-six months from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2010, FIDReC’s Counseling 
Service amicably resolved 1,634 cases, resulting in savings of time and 
resources.122   This measure was designed to further enhance its dispute 
resolution processes, and is especially suitable for resolving disputes which 
are simpler in scope and issues by helping the consumer better understand 
the dispute and relevant issues as well as aiding the consumer in considering 
any settlement offer made by the financial institution in a more objective 
light. 
One of the challenges the Lehman Scheme had to overcome123—
which has also been mentioned above in respect to the Civil Justice 
Reform—relates to the potential abuse of the dispute resolution process, 
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particularly where parties or one party does not approach the dispute 
resolution process with a real intent to resolve the dispute.   
While abuses may have been prevented during the preparatory 
meeting stage in the Lehman Scheme, the proposal to weed out complaints 
that lack merit and other abuses that would be a drain on resources at this 
early stage is not unusual.  In common law jurisdictions, it is not unusual for 
complaints falling outside the jurisdiction of a tribunal to be excluded 
without a hearing, but in the United Kingdom, it is the Ombudsman who is 
empowered to dismiss a complaint without a hearing on its merits for a 
number of well-defined reasons.124  Similarly, it is therefore imperative that 
the FDRC intake officers be trained not only with mediation knowledge but 
also knowledge about the financial industry, and either be subject to review 
or reviewed following an application by the relevant financial institution on 
clearly established grounds.  The prospect of dismissal without hearing or 
review at such an early stage is an area for potential abuse and therefore 
safeguards and oversight will be necessary. 
Given the limits on available resources, a balance must be struck 
between access to justice and preventing abuses of process.  However, it is 
unusual, in comparison with other jurisdictions, for complaints to be weeded 
out at such an early stage, and indeed this may not be appropriate given the 
lack of evidence at this stage.  The task of the intake officer to explore 
settlement and his power to exercise final discretion over vexatious or 
frivolous claims may be interpreted as improper pressure on complainants to 
settle.  In this regard, the concept of an abuse of process in civil court 
procedure and the definitions of vexatious and frivolous complaints might be 
considered for their potential applicability to the preliminary stage, and the 
processes by which unmeritorious claims are dealt with in other jurisdictions 
could also be applied to the FDRC process. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3―THE PRELIMINARY STAGE 
 In light of the high rate of success in Singapore, consideration may be 
given towards modifying the FDRC proposal in respect to the preliminary 
stage to more closely resemble the FIDReC’s preliminary review.  The 
establishment of the issues between the parties early on would help to make 
the entire dispute resolution process more efficient, and indeed, such reviews 
may help a high number of cases reach an early settlement without even 
resorting to the other stages of the FDRC dispute resolution process. 
 It would be preferable, however, for intake officers not to be 
responsible or empowered with final discretion in respect to frivolous or 
vexatious complaints.  This would not be in line with the practices of other 
jurisdictions nor even the judicial system of Hong Kong, where processes 
against frivolous or vexatious complainants are usually initiated by the 
respondent rather than the arbiter―the inappropriateness for the arbiter to be 
both initiator and judge of such a process is clear.  A process separate from 
the exclusion of ineligible complaints or complainants to handle frivolous 
and vexatious complaints should be adopted. 
2. Mediation 
All leading jurisdictions have come to rely primarily on mediation as 
the preferred process for the resolution of disputes, given mediation’s speed 
and simplicity.  All four jurisdictions studied show that the vast majority of 
cases are concluded at the mediation stage.  The criticisms that have been 
leveled against alternative dispute resolution processes, such as the lack of 
an independent and impartial third party during negotiations, and the 
capacity for such processes to mask inbuilt power inequalities between the 
parties,125 are genuine concerns that must be examined alongside questions 
of efficiency.126 
In its Consultation Conclusions, the FSTB emphasized the need for 
quality and qualified mediators and arbitrators, including those with the 
necessary knowledge to deal with financial disputes 127  presumably in 
response to these concerns raised during the consultation. 
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a. Forms of Mediation 
The use of mediation in the FDRC process raises the issue of what 
form that mediation will take.  Generally speaking, among the numerous 
forms of mediation, there are two modes relevant to the resolution of 
financial disputes:  facilitative, which is interest-based, and evaluative or 
rights-based. 
In interest-based mediation, the mediator assists or facilitates 
communications between the parties and negotiations generally.  The role of 
the mediator is to help the parties reach a settlement via exploration of the 
parties underlying interests and needs.128  This is the form of mediation now 
most commonly deployed in Hong Kong through the Civil Justice 
Reform.129 
On the other hand, evaluative mediation involves a mediator making 
an assessment of and expressing a view on the merits of the dispute, albeit a 
non-binding view. 130   This form of mediation is more common to the 
Ombudsman process in other jurisdictions, and is closer to the command 
model of dispute resolution (where a third party is empowered to suggest a 
resolution of the dispute) than a consensual model (where the power to 
resolve the dispute rests with the parties). 
What form of mediation is to be deployed by the FDRC goes to the 
heart of the issues that this study raises:  what type of dispute resolution 
methods are most appropriate for use in the context of financial regulation, 
and how do the aims of financial regulation inform the choice of method? 
b. Criticisms of the Mediation Process 
Despite the success mediation has enjoyed in terms of high rates of 
settlement, particularly in other jurisdictions, it is a form of alternative 
dispute resolution that is not without its critics.  The risk of mediation, being 
an unregulated form of “informal justice”―enjoying a quasi-regulatory 
authority without the safeguards that are built into litigation―is that it can 
mask power imbalances in the relationship between parties.131  This in turn 
could lead to consumer dissatisfaction.  Such critics may also point to the 
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heavier cost consequences in the event that alternative dispute resolution 
processes break down and necessitate court intervention.132 
Locally, despite its wider use and integration into the civil litigation 
process, mediation has been abused by insincere litigants and legal 
professionals,133 which may be attributable to the lack of local experience 
with mediation and the relatively high degree of public trust in the 
independence and expertise of the judicial system.   
c. Appropriateness of Mediation in Financial Dispute Resolution 
One key issue in the facilitative model of mediation is that the 
solution is negotiated, but not required to be principled.  This arguably limits 
the role that the substantive law plays in the settlement of a dispute―as the 
positive law’s norm enforcement is subordinated to the dispute resolution 
process.  In the context of financial markets, this may not be desirable for 
consumers, whose complaints or grievances are likely to arise from a sense 
of wrongdoing on the part of financial service providers, and thus parties 
may have expectations about the protection of the consumers’ rights and 
principled settlements to reflect those rights.  For example, as described 
above, the key issue for Minibonds disputes was whether or not the risks 
were fully disclosed and communicated.  In mediating or arbitrating their 
claims, complainants were quite simply not in a position to understand and 
unravel the complex structure of these instruments in order to quantify the 
risk they potentially represented, and thus know the true value of their own 
claims.134  This placed Minibond complainants at an enormous disadvantage 
when trying to resolve their disputes with the relevant financial institutions, 
in not being fully aware of what their rights against the financial institutions 
were.135  Overcoming this issue requires the integration of legal norms to 
enhance transparency and consistency of settlements.  The use of an 
evaluation of merits such as in evaluative mediation may potentially lend 
itself towards a more satisfactory experience for consumers than interest-
based mediation. 
The power imbalance to be addressed in the financial industry 
between the consumer and financial service provider is based on the 
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assumption that the financial institution is in the best position of knowledge 
in respect to products, services, and risks―arguably even better than 
regulators.  Therefore, safeguards such as regulatory and legal guidelines 
and external oversight may be required to effectively address such 
imbalances.  In the specific context of Hong Kong, its historical 
development as a laissez-faire economy is based on norms of efficiency and 
effective competition, which in turn is driven by the free flow of information.  
Much of the regulatory framework in Hong Kong’s financial markets is built 
on a notion of a level playing field in terms of the knowledge of all the 
participants, rather than the protection of consumers.  An example of the 
regulatory framework redressing knowledge imbalance is the regime against 
insider dealing in Hong Kong, which gives extensive powers of investigation 
to regulators―in particular, the power to curtail the right of silence. 136  
Evaluative mediation, in some cases, may thus be more appropriate in the 
setting of Hong Kong’s financial regulation system to address imbalances of 
power and knowledge between financial service provider and consumer. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 4―MEDIATION 
In developing the mediation stage of the FDRC’s proposed procedure, 
serious consideration may be given to the adoption of evaluative mediation 
in certain cases, in line with the practices of Ombudsmen in other 
jurisdictions.  The relevant power imbalance that the proposed FDRC will 
primarily be called upon to address is that of the state of knowledge between 
the financial service provider and the consumer.  An approach to dispute 
resolution that integrates regulatory standards or uses them as touchstones, 
such as evaluative mediation, thus appears to be more consistent with aims 
of financial oversight in Hong Kong, which is largely disclosure-based. 
3. Arbitration 
Much attention has been focused on the decision that the FDRC use 
an arbitral rather than an ombudsman model.  One key issue in respect to 
appropriateness is following the failure of the mediation process, what is the 
reason the parties have failed to reach a settlement?  Where there are 
inconsistent interpretations of the facts or rules, the role of an intervening 
third party is interpretive, thereby requiring an adjudicator.  Where 
mediation is unsuccessful, complainants may proceed to arbitrate their 
claims.  Arbitration will generally take the form of a documents-only 
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arbitration, before a single arbitrator, unless the issues are too complex, in 
which case the arbitrator will determine whether or not a hearing is 
necessary.  Among the benefits of arbitration is its final binding nature.137  In 
the Consultation Conclusions, the FSTB argued that the use of a two-tiered 
dispute resolution process is in line with overseas experience, and there is 
functionally little difference between an arbitrator and an ombudsman, other 
than that an arbitrator enjoys greater power. 138   The FSTB particularly 
highlighted the fact that Hong Kong has a strong and large pool of 
arbitrators.139  However, some potential challenges with the use of an arbitral 
model also exist given the unique circumstances of Hong Kong. 
a. Submissions by the Law Society 
In adopting an arbitration process over setting up an ombudsman, the 
Consultation Conclusions made particular reference to the submissions of 
the Hong Kong Law Society, which expressed “serious reservations” about 
the establishment of an ombudsman for the purposes of dispute resolution 
for financial service providers.140  The Law Society submissions suggested 
that the negotiation-mediation-arbitration formula proposed for the FDRC 
would be preferable to ombudsman or ombudsman-like set-ups in other 
jurisdictions.141 
b. The Circumstances of Hong Kong 
The lack of familiarity of the public with alternative dispute resolution 
processes should raise concerns about public understanding and 
expectations―the multi-tiered approach of the FDRC resembles the 
hierarchy of the Hong Kong court system, but the arbitral process under the 
proposed FDRC procedure is of course not intended to be a review of the 
mediation process.  It should be noted that in the United States, mediation is 
not mandatory, and undergoing mediation is not a prerequisite to securities 
arbitration.  The absence of review between the mediation and arbitration 
processes in the proposed FDRC should be contrasted with the multi-tiered 
structure used by the ombudsmen in other common law jurisdictions, and in 
particular, the notion of an internal right of review as mentioned above, 
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which more closely resembles the court processes to which the public of 
Hong Kong is accustomed. 
It should also be borne in mind that at present, the pool of arbitrators 
with sufficient experience in both arbitration and financial regulation 
appears to be limited―the HKIAC issued a notice to the Bar offering 
training for the purposes of the Scheme (emphasizing prior mediation 
experience in particular),142 illustrating the need for growth in the existing 
pool of mediators and arbitrators in this area. 
In the context of financial regulation in Hong Kong, questions as to 
the appropriateness of arbitration must be raised in light of the experience in 
the United States in contrast with that of the FOS (UK).  In this regard, 
appearance and perception of consumers appears to play as important a role 
as actual function. 
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RECOMMENDATION 5―ARBITRATION 
 The arbitral process proposed under the FDRC already avoids one of 
the major issues that have made the United States’ securities arbitration 
controversial, in that the arbitral process is non-mandatory. 
 The advantages offered by the ombudsman model do not necessarily 
mean that an ombudsman model need be adopted by the FDRC wholesale; 
rather, the FDRC arbitral process may be customized to resemble the 
ombudsman model or to offer its benefits, for example, by using an informal 
process.  Rather than adopting a papers-only arbitration, which offers 
efficiency but may raise issues about transparency, particularly in the 
decision-making process, a procedure resembling the Small Claims Tribunal 
should be considered.  Complainants should still be offered a papers-only 
arbitration if they prefer, with costs scaled appropriately, but complainants 
should not be denied the opportunity to air their grievances in person and to 
scrutinize the decision-making process―particularly as it appears from the 
experience in the United Kingdom that a more personal approach is more 
successful in addressing consumer expectations and attitudes. 
 Although proponents of arbitration in the FDRC argue that finality 
may be one of the key advantages offered over the ombudsman model, 
serious consideration should be given to increasing the scrutiny of the courts 
over the FDRC arbitral process, possibly through the adoption of the 
relevant opt-in clauses under the new Arbitration Ordinance.  While in the 
short term, this may lead to increased costs, the courts’ expanded powers to 
penalize litigants whose cases are frivolous under the Civil Justice Reform 
should be borne in mind.  The long-term advantage is the strengthening of 
the authoritativeness of the FDRC through its interaction and confirmation 
by the courts. 
4. Litigation 
One issue that is not detailed in the proposal is how the FDRC 
processes will interact with or inform litigation, for example, where a 
complainant engages in the FDRC mediation process and subsequently opts 
to air remaining dissatisfaction in the courts rather than by way of arbitration.  
Of particular relevance is how information that has been exchanged by the 
parties in the course of the preliminary stage or the mediation stage (or 
indeed even the arbitration stage) is to be dealt with before the courts. 
The mediation process under the Civil Justice Reform is a confidential 
process―effectively characterized as “without prejudice” negotiations.  
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However, as has been noted above, there exists between consumers and 
financial service providers a potential information gap, which the FDRC 
may be required to bridge to enhance the fairness between parties.  It 
therefore may not be a simple matter of applying the same confidentiality to 
FDRC processes, as the information that emerges may well be key to 
attaining justice for either side before the courts. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 6―LITIGATION 
Where a complainant seeks to bring a case from the FDRC to the 
courts, the FDRC should play a role similar to that of the scheme―to 
attempt to narrow down the facts and issues between the parties.  This would 
make the litigation process more efficient and overcome any issues relating 
to disclosed information by agreement between the parties as to the facts 
prior to litigation. 
5. Awards 
The maximum award that is proposed to be made under the 
jurisdiction of the FDRC is HK$500,000.143  This is said to cover “over 80% 
of the monetary disputes handled by the HKMA and about 80% of stock 
investors.”144 
TABLE 4 
SCHEME LIMITS OF AWARDS 
FOS 
(UK) 
The maximum money award the Ombudsman may make is £100,000145 
(approx. HK$1,270,000), from which costs, interest on the principal award 
and interest on costs are excluded.146  
FOS 
(Aus) 
As of January 1, 2012, the ASIC will require compensation caps from 
external dispute resolution schemes of at least AU$280,000 (approx. 
HK$2,296,000), except in the case of general insurance brokers, where the 
compensation cap is at least AU$150,000.147  
FIDReC The maximum monetary awards for compensation are US$100,000 for 
claims against insurance companies, and US$50,000 (approx. HK$310,000) 
for all other disputes.148 
FINRA No statutory cap is imposed on the value of awards,149 and awards are final 
and binding, even if new evidence surfaces later.150 
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  FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 42. 
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  Id., DISP 3.7.5. 
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 The monetary award limit is considerably lower than that of the UK or 
Australia, but higher than that of Singapore.  The FSTB clarified in its 
Consultation Conclusions that the cap applies to individual claims, and thus 
complainants could bring claims that add up to more than $500,000 where 
there is more than one dispute.151  It was also clarified that claims for over 
$500,000 could be brought, but the maximum award would remain at 
$500,000.152  This cap will be reviewed from time to time.153 
While the reasoning behind the limit on awards appears sound, it is 
unclear whether or not the complaints handled by the HKMA concerning 
monetary disputes mentioned in the Consultation Document include the 
large numbers of Minibond claims, and if such a figure takes into account 
claims that are taken to court by eligible complainants rather than to the 
HKMA.  It should be noted that the civil jurisdiction of the district court is 
currently for claims under $1,000,000, and thus consumers may have chosen 
to pursue their private rights at the district court rather than to bring the 
matter to the HKMA given the HKMA’s lack of jurisdiction in respect to 
consumer compensation. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 7―AWARDS 
Serious consideration should be given to raising the limit of the 
FDRC’s jurisdiction to HK$1 million in order to bring it in line with other 
jurisdictions.  Provision should also be made for the jurisdiction of the 
FDRC to track the jurisdiction of the district court so that when the district 
court increases its jurisdiction, the FDRC should follow suit.  This would 
also serve to ensure that the courts need not be overly burdened by smaller 
securities claims and at the same time, would enable a greater number of 
consumers to make use of the FDRC rather than be forced to engage in 
costly litigation merely because their claims are of a sum higher than 
HK$500,000. 
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C. Costs 
It is proposed that the FDRC will charge both consumers and financial 
institutions on a “pay as you use” basis for its services. 154   Under the 
Consultation Conclusions, the fee structure was set out as follows: 
TABLE 5 
FEE TYPE CLAIMANT FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION 
Making enquiries Nil Not applicable 
Filing a claim form HK$200 Not applicable 
Mediation 
Amount of claims: 
- less than HK$100,000 
 - between HK$100,000-$500,000 
(Case fees) 
 
HK$1,000 
HK$2,000 
(Case fees) 
 
HK$5,000 
HK$10,000 
Arbitration (regardless of amount of 
claims) 
(Case fees) 
HK$5,000 
(Case fees) 
HK$20,000 
1. Comparing the Charges of Ombudsmen and the SROs 
The proposed costs of the FDRC may be contrasted with the 
ombudsmen in common law jurisdictions, which offer their services free of 
charge, or charge a nominal case fee for adjudication under Singapore’s 
FIDReC. 
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  Id. at 42. 
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TABLE 6 
SCHEME COSTS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES 
FOS 
(UK) 
Consumers do not pay to bring complaints to the FOS.155  Businesses do not 
pay case fees in respect to the first three complaints settled during a year, 
but there is a fee of £500 for the fourth and each subsequent complaint.156  
The FSA Handbook expressly sets out that complainants do not need to 
have professional advisers to bring complaints, and thus awards of costs 
should be uncommon.157 
FOS 
(Aus) 
Per the requirements of ASIC, external dispute resolution schemes provide 
their services free of charge to consumers.158  
FIDReC No fees are charged to consumers where the dispute is resolved by case 
management or mediation.159  A US$50 fee is charged to consumers where 
the dispute is escalated to the adjudication stage to deter frivolous 
complaints, but is kept low in order to ensure FIDReC is affordable for 
consumers.160 
FINRA As of April 14, 2011, the arbitration filing fee for a customer of a member 
firm of FINRA for an undisclosed amount and/or other relief (determined 
by a panel of three arbitrators per Rule 13900(b)) is US$1,250 (approx. 
HK$9,750) and the estimated hearing fees for one day of hearing is 
US$3,000 (approx. HK$23,400).161 
2. Purposes of Charging 
In the consultation process, it was stated that the fee structure was 
intended to be affordable for complainants but at the same time be set at 
levels that would provide an incentive to resolve disputes at an early 
stage. 162   The amounts also take into consideration the market rates for 
mediators in Hong Kong at present.163 
Due to the express mandate of the regulators of the United Kingdom 
and Australia in respect to consumer protection, ombudsmen services are 
free of charge. 
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A considerably lower nominal amount is charged to consumers in 
Singapore when the dispute is escalated to the adjudication stage―the fee is 
imposed to deter frivolous complaints, but is minimized in order to ensure 
FIDReC is affordable for consumers. 
In respect to the considerably higher costs of FINRA arbitration, one 
commentator has pointed out that unlike in the case of the United Kingdom 
or Australia, since FINRA complainants must pay an arbitration fee, a 
hearing deposit, and attorneys’ fees, cost-deterrence serves as a filter, and 
therefore strict jurisdictional prerequisites for arbitration are unnecessary.164 
It is thus clear that one of the purposes of charging costs of dispute 
resolution to consumers is to filter out frivolous complaints, as well as to 
encourage settlement of disputes at an early stage, thus preventing draining 
limited resources.  However, as is noted above, jurisdictional prerequisites 
also serve similar purposes in respect to allocation of resources. 
In comparison with the costs of litigation, the proposed costs of the 
FDRC are still relatively low, but whether or not these costs could serve as 
an obstacle to access to justice may depend on associated costs. 
3. Associated Costs 
One key issue that was addressed in the recommendations of the SFC 
is that of legal representation, and whether or not parties will be entitled to 
have legal representatives, particularly at the arbitration stage.  In the case of 
the ombudsmen in common law jurisdictions, legal representation is not 
allowed, in line with the suggestion of the SFC that legal representation 
should be discouraged for the purposes of a financial dispute resolution 
scheme in Hong Kong.  In the United States, the involvement of legal 
representatives has increased both the cost and complexity of securities 
regulation.  This is a significant issue for the FSTB to address, as it has the 
potential to either drive up costs and formality (where legal representation is 
allowed) or to create an impression of inequality between the parties, 
particularly as to their experience with disputes and presenting their cases 
(where legal representation is not allowed). 
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RECOMMENDATION 8―COSTS 
It is suggested that costs should be scaled for persons falling under the 
“professional investor” definition, particularly high net worth individuals, to 
ensure the subsidies of the FDRC to dispute resolution processes are 
allocated according to need. 
It is also suggested that costs should be brought in line with the costs 
of other schemes such as the one for insurance products in order to enhance 
consistency and discourage forum shopping by consumers. 
IV. ASSESSING THE PROPOSAL AGAINST THE MINIBONDS CRISIS 
In view of the Minibonds Crisis as providing the impetus for the 
creation of the FDRC, it is a pertinent and useful exercise to examine the 
dispute resolution process of the FDRC in a hypothetical application to the 
Minibonds Crisis in order to further explore certain regulatory issues in a 
practical context. 
One may presume that with Hong Kong’s financial markets 
characterized by a high number of individual retail investors and Minibonds 
framed as over-the-counter retail investment product, a high number of 
Minibond complainants would have been eligible complainants.  One may 
also presume that a high proportion of those eligible complainants would 
have claims within the award limit of the FDRC given the reasoning by 
which the award limit was established.  Thus, had the FDRC existed at the 
time of the Minibonds Crisis, it could be presumed that the FDRC would 
have received a high number of Minibond complaints. 
While the Minibonds Crisis in and of itself may be characterized as 
highly out of the ordinary, the issues it raises in the context of the FDRC 
may not be. 
A. Consistency and Playing for the Rules 
One aspect of the FDRC process that could potentially lead to 
complainants being at a disadvantage is the fact that as time progresses, 
financial institutions may build up experience in respect to claims amounts 
and settlements as repeat players.  By contrast, consumers, as one-time users, 
may be left in the dark as to the true value of their complaint.  Under the 
facilitative model of mediation, as mediators only facilitate discussions and 
are not supposed to give advice, the experience of the mediators in this 
regard does not assist complainants. 
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While it is proposed that the FDRC will publish data about 
disputes,165 the confidential nature of the settlements appears to mean that 
there will be no guidance for consumers or even arbitrators as to settlement 
amounts and awards for cases that involve similar facts or issues.  This not 
only gives rise to a potential issue of uneven rates of settlement but also 
means that each dispute is destined to go through the same time-consuming 
process rather than to increase efficiency in reaching settlement of common 
or similar complaints. 
One study in the United Kingdom demonstrated the effectiveness of 
the ombudsman model in neutralizing the advantage of financial service 
providers due to the lack of formality and evaluative nature of decision-
making.  Such characteristics could well be adopted by the FDRC, and in 
order to ensure consistency, the FDRC should arrange for frequent meetings 
of its staff, mediators, and arbitrators to discuss their experiences with 
claims and how they handled them. 
B. Systemic Issues and Parallel Jurisdiction 
As set out in the consultation document, the role of the FDRC is not 
intended to be regulatory.  It thus does not engage in any investigation and 
would only deal with the monetary aspects of cases that could also include 
regulatory violations. 166   Furthermore, where the FDRC handles cases 
involving systemic and widespread regulatory violations, the FDRC will 
turn these cases over to the regulators to deal with and cease to handle 
them.167 
Thus, even though Minibond claimants may have been eligible 
complainants and within the award limit of the FDRC, they may potentially 
have been barred from bringing the regulatory aspects of the complaints to 
the FDRC. 
 Thus far, no review of the Minibonds Crisis has characterized it as 
systemic, but whether or not its widespread nature may have led it to be 
considered systemic at least for the purposes of early warning or until more 
facts about the Minibonds emerged raises questions about what actions 
would be appropriate in the face of a systemic concern, and what effect 
systemic issues will have on the private rights of complainants in the FDRC 
context. 
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V. ASSESSING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS 
FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Whether or not the FDRC can avoid the perception of a de facto 
protector of consumer rights in the financial markets of Hong Kong remains 
to be seen.  Other than its place in the regulatory structure, an equally 
important assessment is the appropriateness of alternative dispute resolution 
techniques for financial dispute resolution.  In the course of this article, 
several ideas have emerged for the enhancement of the FDRC proposal with 
respect to the experience of similar schemes in other jurisdictions.  This 
suggests that some methods of dispute resolution may be preferred over 
others due to the needs of disputes between consumers and financial service 
providers.  One example of such a need is the need to bridge the 
power/knowledge gap between consumers and financial service providers. 
Different jurisdictions offer different answers to the question of 
whether or not financial dispute resolution schemes necessarily play 
regulatory roles.  Alternative dispute resolution schemes are usually set up 
with efficiency in mind―in the particular context of financial markets, 
enhancing market efficiency by reducing the resources devoted to dispute 
resolution.  Such schemes are supplemental to, rather than substitutive of the 
court system, and lack a judicial mandate. The non-binding nature of the 
ombudsmen and adjudicator’s decisions (except where accepted by the 
complainant) is perhaps the clearest indicator that there is no intent to 
completely displace the judicial function.  By contrast, the FINRA 
arbitration scheme is accepted as part of the regulatory mechanism in the 
United States, and its mandatory nature and unrestricted jurisdiction appear 
to imply a mandate to displace the court function in certain aspects of 
financial regulation.   
In navigating the potential areas of overlap between the regulatory and 
non-regulatory functions of financial dispute resolution service providers, 
the parallel complaints procedure must be clearly established between the 
dispute resolution service and the regulators, and in matters of fact-finding, 
the lead must be taken by the regulators.168  For jurisdictions that do not 
have a specific consumer protection mandate, such as in Hong Kong, it 
should be borne in mind that in the aftermath of the Minibonds Crisis, there 
may be an expectation on the part of the public that a dispute resolution 
body be set up for the purposes of filling in the consumer protection gap and 
resolving disputes in the absence of such a regulatory mandate.  
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In considering what forms of alternative dispute resolution are 
suitable for addressing disputes between consumers and financial service 
providers, the need for the third party intervener in any mode of dispute 
resolution to address the power/knowledge gap is clear.  The need to address 
the gap may, particularly at the early stages of dispute resolution, lend itself 
towards the command end of the dispute resolution spectrum and the 
integration of relevant standards and rules, at least as touchstones, to inform 
an equitable negotiation process.  It may suggest the need for external 
experts, information centers, and resources to be made available to 
unrepresented parties.  The integration of such norms, however, does not 
necessarily lend itself to a regulatory role. 
Even in the absence of, or separate from a consumer protection 
mandate, the principles of equity, fairness and transparency operate to bridge 
the power/knowledge gap between consumers and financial service 
providers in order to achieve equity in the dispute resolution process.  This 
may arguably be considered a reflection of the regulatory philosophy of 
disclosure that dominates financial regulation. 
The premise that inquisitorial, semi-evaluative models of dispute 
resolution are better suited where the intent is a regulatory role, and 
consensual models are to be preferred in the context of non-regulatory 
dispute resolution schemes, must therefore be supplemented by an 
underlying notion of what is necessary to achieve equity and fairness 
between the two disputing parties in determining appropriateness.  Hence, to 
a certain extent, command elements may be necessary for the resolution of 
financial disputes even where consensual models are being used. 
VI. CONCLUSION: ENHANCING THE FDRC 
The consultation documents on the FDRC refer to four main 
principles on which the FDRC is based:  independence, impartiality, 
accessibility, and efficiency.169  Further reference is made to principles such 
as affordability, speediness, cost effectiveness, and confidentiality—all of 
which are important principles in the implementation of financial dispute 
resolution programs.170 
Specific suggestions have been made in this paper to different aspects 
of the FDRC process in light of experience in other jurisdictions.  These 
include 1) improving accessibility via the expansion of eligible complainants, 
while at the same time enhancing cost effectiveness by restricting the 
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subsidized access of professional investors or scaling the charges of the 
FDRC for different types of users, 2) reducing the reliance upon the 
monetary nature distinction, instead of streamlining and emphasizing the 
parallel procedure of processing complaints by regulators and the FDRC, 
and avoiding inconsistency and confusion by clearly carving out disputes 
relating to MPF and insurance products from the jurisdiction of the FDRC or 
creating uniform handling processes for such disputes, 3) where the FDRC 
process fails to resolve the dispute, attempts should be made at the FDRC 
stage to narrow down the factual disputes and issues between the parties in 
order to enhance the efficiency of litigation, 4) the limit on awards the 
FDRC can make should be increased to reflect the jurisdiction of the district 
court and further enhance accessibility, and 5) costs should not only be 
scaled, but associated costs of the FDRC process should be reduced by 
barring legal representation from the FDRC, thus improving the cost 
effectiveness of the process overall. 
 While it is clear that some of the ideas and suggestions enhance the 
proposed FDRC in accordance with the principles on which it is based, (e.g., 
expanding eligible complainants increases accessibility), many of the ideas 
and suggestions emerge from the comparison of the proposal to the 
experience with financial dispute resolution schemes of other jurisdictions. 
In the context of the foregoing discussion on distinguishing between 
regulatory and non-regulatory schemes of dispute resolution, many of the 
suggestions can be explained by their emphasis on the non-regulatory role of 
the FDRC.  Specifically, the adoption of a parallel complaints-handling 
procedure led by the financial regulators emphasizes the fact that the FDRC 
has no investigative powers of its own, while the suggestion that the FDRC 
arbitral awards should not be binding unless the complainant so chooses 
means that the FDRC process does not exercise a judicial function or 
displaces the courts, which is arguably the strongest indicator of a regulatory 
role. 
The appropriateness of the form of dispute resolution for a non-
regulatory scheme also implies that many of the suggestions are concerned 
with the reduction of the command elements in the FDRC process, or with 
moving them down the spectrum away from the command end.  The idea of 
non-binding arbitral awards is one way in which the FDRC process can be 
made more consensual, while the exclusion of legal representation not only 
lowers costs but also has the potential to decrease formality.  
However, the principles that bind the majority of the suggestions 
together are those of equity and fairness.  Restricting professional investors’ 
subsidized access to the FDRC not only improves cost effectiveness but also 
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enhances the distribution of the FDRC’s resources to where the need for 
them may be greater.  The parallel complaints-handling mechanism and 
suggestion of reference to regulatory and legal touchstones operates to 
ensure that the knowledge gap between consumers and financial service 
providers will be bridged.  The adoption of a separate process for dealing 
with frivolous or vexatious complaints should ensure that complainants are 
not barred from the FDRC process on a mere prima facie basis―but at the 
same time, such a process should also help to protect against frivolous and 
vexatious claims.   
The appropriateness of the evaluative model of mediation has been 
discussed already:  the need to bridge the knowledge gap for consumers 
speaks to a principle of equity and fairness by ensuring a level playing field 
in terms of information―particularly about the true value of claims, as the 
Minibonds Crisis served to demonstrate. 
The changes suggested in respect to the arbitration stage of the FDRC 
process serve not only to enhance the fairness of the process but also the 
appearance of fairness―justice not only being done but also seen to be done.  
Allowing hearings where complainants desire them and increasing the 
oversight of the courts over the FDRC process subjects the FDRC to greater 
scrutiny and the safeguards of the court system, which in turn should serve 
to build confidence in the FDRC. 
By charging the FDRC with a further duty to narrow down factual 
disputes and issues between the parties even if the complaint cannot be 
resolved should assist in dealing with how information that has been 
disclosed during the FDRC process is to be treated in the course of litigation.  
This should enhance the efficiency of litigation, but also offers a degree of 
protection to parties where, for example, in the course of the FDRC process 
it comes to light that there may be some contributory negligence on either 
side―encouraging parties to agree how disclosed information is to be dealt 
with prevents the abuse of positions of information that are established under 
the FDRC. 
The study of financial dispute resolution schemes in different 
jurisdictions has, in this paper, led to tentative conclusions that the 
appropriateness of the dispute resolution method is arguably informed by a 
regulatory or non-regulatory role―dispute resolution modes closer to the 
command model must incorporate safeguards for the disputants against the 
discretion of the third party intervener.  But even for non-regulatory schemes, 
command elements such as the provision of legal and regulatory standards to 
complainants may still be incorporated into consensual models of dispute 
resolution, which speaks to a de minimis level of equity and fairness that 
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must be achieved.  The establishment and future effectiveness of the FDRC 
will undoubtedly be measured against a number of important principles, as 
espoused in the Consultation document, and not least of which include 
fairness and equity.  Just as the deceived investor will not invest, 
complainants with no confidence in a financial dispute resolution scheme 
will not make use of it, serving only to drive up the resources needed to 
resolve financial disputes.  Even absent a consumer protection mandate, the 
need for a financial dispute resolution scheme to be designed according to 
principles of fairness and equity not only reflects broader aims of a financial 
regulation system, but on a practical level, furthers the aim of such schemes 
to increase market efficiency, stability, and ideally to prevent the 
exploitation of consumer investors. 
